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Senseless Sentencing: The Uneven
Application of the Career Offender
Guidelines
Christopher Ethan Watts*
Abstract
Federal appellate courts are currently split on the definition of
“controlled substance” in the career offender guideline, with one
side using federal law to define the phrase, and the other side
allowing standalone state law offenses to trigger the guideline.
Allowing state law to define the phrase allows countless substances
Congress never intended to penalize to be able to trigger one of the
most severe penalties in the Sentencing Guidelines. This Note
assesses the landscape of the circuit split and analyzes the
arguments for and against federally defining “controlled substance
offense.” This Note then proposes a novel way to resolve the circuit
split using the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Labonte to federally define “controlled substance offense.”
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I. Introduction: First Things First1
Picture yourself as a child again. Like most children, your
parents have rules for their household that, if broken, come with
consequences. One specific rule your household has is absolutely
no candy under any circumstances. Your mother defines candy
very broadly, including almost every kind of candy imaginable, but
does not include peppermint candies due to their health benefits.
Your mother has made it very clear that candy, as she has defined
it, is not allowed in her house, and possession of it will result in
your favorite toy—say a gaming console—being taken away for a
week. Your mother is also aware that a weeklong prohibition on
gaming is not that big of a deterrent, so she adds to this rule by
explaining that after the third time you are caught with candy, she
will permanently take away the gaming console. While she creates
the rules, she lets your father handle the disciplinary side.
Because you are a mischievous child with a sweet tooth, your
father has already caught you with candy twice, once with some
bubblegum and a second time with chocolate. At this point, you are
especially careful because the permanent loss of your gaming
console looms on the horizon with a third offense. One evening, you
go over to your friend’s house for a sleepover and after dinner, your
friend’s mother offers you some peppermint candies for dessert.
You gladly accept, because this is one of the few candies your
mother still allows you to eat. The next morning, your father picks
you up from your friend’s house and your friend’s mom informs him
that you had candy the night before because you were being such
a well-behaved child and, well, your father is furious. You
desperately try to explain to your father that you only had
peppermint, something that your mother does not consider candy.
These pleadings fall on deaf ears, and your father throws your
gaming console out of a second story window to teach you a lesson.
It seems like your father is being nonsensical in this hypothetical
right?

1. Although this phrase is almost always followed by “rest in peace Uncle
Phil,” for the purposes of this Note it will be used to introduce the career offender
sentencing guidelines; JERMAINE COLE, No Role Modelz, on 2014 FOREST HILLS
DRIVE (Columbia 2015) (“First things first rest in peace Uncle Phil.”).

210

28 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 205 (2021)

Now replace “your mother” with federal law, “your friend’s
mother” with state law, “your father” with federal courts, “candy”
with “controlled substance,” and a “gaming console” with freedom.
That is exactly how some federal circuit courts are treating the
phrase “controlled substance offense” in the career offender
guideline.2
The career offender guideline in § 4B1.1(a) reads:
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least
eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the
instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction
is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior
felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense.3

Section 4B1.2(b) defines “controlled substance offense” as
an offense under federal or state law, punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the
manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a
controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the
possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance)
with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or
dispense.4

The phrase “or state” was only added to allow state law that is
substantially similar to federal law to trigger the sentencing
enhancement.5 But several federal appellate courts are allowing
standalone state law “controlled substance offenses” that the
federal government never intended to penalize trigger one of the
“most severe penalties under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines.”6
2. See United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642, 654 (7th Cir. 2020) (rejecting
the Jerome Presumption and allowing standalone state law “controlled substance
offenses” to trigger the career offender sentencing enhancement); see also United
States v. Ward, 972 F.3d 364, 372 (4th Cir. 2020) (using a plain meaning
framework to allow standalone state law “controlled substance offenses” to trigger
the career offender sentencing enhancement).
3. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(a) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
4. Id. § 4B1.2(b).
5. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CAREER OFFENDER
SENTENCE, app. A-6 (2016) (explaining the meaning behind the phrase
“substantially similar”).
6. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, QUICK FACTS CAREER OFFENDERS (2018).
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The career offender guideline in § 4B1.1 already poses
substantial public policy issues and allowing state law to control
the definition of “controlled substance offense” only serves to
worsen those issues.7 The arguments in favor of allowing
standalone state law definitions are fundamentally flawed, leaving
the only viable option being federally defining “controlled
substance offense” as those substances listed in the federal
Controlled Substance Act.8
This Note examines the history of both the Sentencing
Commission and the career offender guideline, breaks down the
current circuit split over the definition of “controlled substance
offense,” critiques the arguments of the federal appellate circuits,
outlines the public policy issues with the guideline, and proposes a
novel solution which the Supreme Court can use to resolve the
split. In summary, Part II provides the background information
necessary to assess the landscape of the career offender sentencing
enhancement.9 Part III gives a detailed look into the current circuit
split over the definition of “controlled substance offense” and
points out the fundamental flaws in the arguments against
federally defining the phrase.10 Part IV discusses the public policy
issues surrounding the career offender guideline.11 Part V proposes
a novel solution to the circuit split that federally defines
“controlled substance offense.”12 Part VI concludes.13

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
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II. A Brief Background of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
& the Career Offender Sentencing Enhancement
A. An Overview of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
1. The Effect of the Sentencing Reform Act
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”) fundamentally
altered the direction of federal sentencing.14 Congress enacted the
SRA in response to the wide disparity in federal sentencing.15 The
Act created the United States Sentencing Commission
(“Commission”) which was, and currently still is, composed of
seven voting and two non-voting members.16 The seven voting
members of the Commission are nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, with the two non-voting members being
the Attorney General, or the Attorney General’s designee, and the
Chair of the United States Parole Commission.17 The Commission
is an independent agency within the Judicial Branch tasked with
developing United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Sentencing
Guidelines”) that federal judges employ when sentencing offenders
that commit federal crimes.18 The overall goal of the Sentencing
Guidelines is to create “reasonable uniformity in sentencing by
narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar
criminal offenses committed by similar offenders.”19

14. See ROGER W. HAINES, JR. ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
HANDBOOK 12 (Thomson Reuters ed., 2019–2020 ed. 2019) (showing the impact of
the Sentencing Reform Act).
15. See About the Commission, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N (explaining the cause of
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984) [https://perma.cc/7RDY-6GK8].
16. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)
(outlining the basics of the Commission).
17. See About the Commission, supra note 15 (showing the members of the
Sentencing Commission) [https://perma.cc/7RDY-6GK8].
18. See HAINES ET AL., supra note 14, at 12 (explaining the role of the
Commission).
19. U.S SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
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To correct the course of federal sentencing, Congress outlined
three objectives in the SRA.20 The first objective Congress had
when creating the Sentencing Guidelines was to reduce crime
through “honesty in sentencing.”21 Before the SRA, federal courts
operated under an indeterminate sentencing system.22 This
allowed inmates to earn “good time” credits, often only having to
serve around a third of the sentence that the court handed down,
with the parole commission controlling how much time an offender
actually served.23 To combat this, the Commission eliminated
parole from the federal system, which now operates under a
determinate system of sentencing—inmates now serve at least
eighty-five percent of the prison sentence the courts hand down
and are subject to mandatory minimums.24
Congress’ second and third objectives go hand in hand—
uniformity and proportionality.25 Uniformity seeks to “treat
similar cases alike,” and proportionality seeks to “treat different
cases differently.”26 These competing interests create a tension
between the two mandates.27 Take robbery for example—
uniformity requires all robbers serve the same amount of time,
because the offenders fall within the same classification.28
Proportionality, on the other hand, requires the Sentencing
Guidelines to differentiate between different kinds of robbery, with
an armed robbery being treated differently than an unarmed
robbery.29 The interplay between the competing mandates caused
the Sentencing Guidelines to become expansive in categorizing
20. See HAINES ET AL., supra note 14, at 2 (listing three objectives needed to
enhance the criminal justice system).
21. See id. (establishing a fair sentencing regime).
22. See id. (allowing inmates to serve less than the full sentence handed
down).
23. See id. (showing how the parole commission controlled the length
inmates were sentenced).
24. See Prison Time Surges for Federal Inmates, PEW CHARITABLE TRUST
(Nov. 18, 2015) (explaining the eighty-five percent rule) [https://perma.cc/W5S78USU].
25. See HAINES ET AL., supra note 14, at 3 (showing the difficulty of
concurrently seeking uniformity and proportionality).
26. Id.
27. See id. (noting the tension between competing mandates).
28. See id. (using robbery as an example to discuss uniformity).
29. See id. (using robbery as an example to discuss proportionality).
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crimes to promote both uniformity and proportionality.30
Throughout the decades, the Sentencing Guideline’s mission to
create “reasonable uniformity in sentencing” has not changed.31
To maintain the three objectives Congress outlined, the
Commission is also responsible for monitoring the Sentencing
Guidelines.32 The Sentencing Guidelines require continuing
review by the Commission.33 When proposing amendments, the
Commission looks to “congressional action, decisions from courts
of appeals, sentencing-related research, and input from the
criminal justice community.”34
Because of the congressional mandate, the Sentencing
Guidelines go through a yearly amendment cycle.35 Beginning in
June, the Commission publishes a “tentative list of policy
priorities” in the Federal Register, as well as on the Commission’s
website, to solicit input from experts in sentencing and the general
public.36 The Commission also holds public hearings, where it
receives testimony regarding the proposed amendments.37
Afterwards, “the Commission votes on whether to adopt
amendments.”38 The proposed amendments are then submitted to
Congress for a six month review period, and if Congress takes no
action the amendments become effective.39 Congress rarely takes
action in this regard, as it has only rejected two amendments since

30. See id. (explaining the need for an expansive Sentencing Guideline).
31. See U.S SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)
(“[T]he Commission developed these guidelines as a practical effort toward the
achievement of a more honest, uniform, equitable, proportional, and therefore
effective sentencing system.”).
32. See HAINES ET AL., supra note 14, at 14 (empowering the Commission to
propose amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines).
33. See id. at 12 (“The mandate rested on congressional awareness that
sentencing is a dynamic field that requires continuing review by an expert body
to revise sentencing policies, in light of application experience, as new criminal
statutes are enacted, and as more is learned about what motivates and controls
criminal behavior.”).
34. Policymaking, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N [https://perma.cc/AR3H-W3BM].
35. See id. (dubbing the process, the “amendment cycle”).
36. See id. (referring to the procedure that the Sentencing Guidelines go
through).
37. See id. (listening to testimony at public hearings).
38. Id.
39. See id. (explaining the amendment process).
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1987.40 However, amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines
commentary do not need Congressional approval and may be
“promulgated and put into effect at any time.”41 By reviewing the
Sentencing Guidelines yearly, the Commission accomplishes the
statutory mission Congress set forth in the SRA.42
2. How the Supreme Court Shaped the Application of the
Guidelines
Two major developments have shaped how the Sentencing
Guidelines are applied in practice.43 The first major development
is the commentary in the Guidelines Manual becoming binding on
federal courts.44 To establish the sentencing policies and practices
the SRA laid out, the Commission created the Guidelines
Manual.45 The Guidelines Manual includes three kinds of text: the
Guidelines provisions themselves, the accompanying commentary,
and general policy statements.46 Extensive commentary
accompanies the provisions and policy statements, explaining how
the Sentencing Guidelines should be applied and interpreted.47

40. See Basics of Federal Sentencing I: The Evolution of Federal Sentencing,
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N (highlighting the rarity of congressional intervention in the
Sentencing Guidelines amendment process) [https://perma.cc/Q87E-KZMZ].
41. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 6 (Aug. 16,
2016) (showing that commentary can be amended without congressional
approval).
42. See HAINES ET AL., supra note 14, at 15 (showing how yearly amendments
bolster the Commission’s ability to fulfill its purpose).
43. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) (holding that the
commentary which interprets the Sentencing Guidelines is authoritative); United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227 (2005) (holding that the mandatory nature of
the Sentencing Guidelines is unconstitutional).
44. See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38 (1993) (making the commentary to the
Sentencing Guidelines binding on federal courts unless it violates the
Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous
reading of, that guideline).
45. See id. at 41 (accomplishing the Commission’s goal by creating the
Guideline Manual).
46. See id. (subdividing the Guidelines Manual into three parts).
47. See id. (stating the purpose of the commentary).
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In Stinson v. United States,48 the U.S. Supreme Court adopted
the practice of using the commentary accompanying the
Sentencing Guidelines as binding interpretive authority, provided
it does not violate the U.S. Constitution or is plainly erroneous.49
Stinson grappled with whether the Commission could amend the
commentary without Congressional approval and bind federal
courts to that interpretation.50 Specifically, the Commission
amended the commentary to § 4B1.2, adding the sentence: “The
term ‘crime of violence’ does not include the offense of unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon.”51 This effectively redefined the
phrase “crime of violence” and changed the meaning of the entire
provision.52 Importantly, the language of the Sentencing
Guidelines provisions stayed the same, with only the
accompanying commentary changing.53
The Supreme Court ruled that amending the commentary
without congressional approval was within the statutory
boundaries Congress set forth and that judges must adhere to the
interpretation the commentary provides unless that commentary
is unconstitutional.54 The decision in Stinson allows the
Commission to interpret and explain the Sentencing Guidelines
provisions through commentary and definitional sections, without
express approval from Congress.55
The second major development is the Sentencing Guidelines’
shift from being mandatory to advisory.56 Before 2005, the
48. See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38 (1993) (holding that the commentary that
interprets the Sentencing Guidelines is authoritative).
49. See id. (making the commentary authoritative provided that it is
constitutional and not clearly erroneous).
50. See id. at 39 (considering whether the addition of one sentence to the
commentary redefined the entire provision).
51. See U.S SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
52. See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38 (1993) (changing the meaning of § 4B1.2 by
adding a sentence).
53. See id. (understanding the Commission’s ability to alter a provision in
the Sentencing Guidelines without changing the actual provision).
54. See id. at 42 (making the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines
authoritative unless it is unconstitutional or clearly erroneous).
55. See id. at 46 (allowing the Commission to revise the Sentencing
Guidelines through the commentary).
56. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005) (changing the
Sentencing Guidelines to advisory).
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Sentencing Guidelines had the force and effect of law and were
binding on all federal judges.57 However, in United States v.
Booker,58 the Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines
were advisory and that federal judges could deviate from the
guideline ranges.59 In spite of this holding, Booker deviances are
rare, and district courts are still required to properly calculate and
consider the Sentencing Guidelines when sentencing.60 Even
though they are now advisory, courts still consider the Sentencing
Guidelines to be integral to the sentencing process.61
Moreover, district courts are also given a different level of
scrutiny when sentencing within a properly calculated guidelines
range.62 In Rita v. United States,63 the Supreme Court held that
federal appellate courts may apply a presumption of
reasonableness standard to the sentences imposed by the district
courts, provided they properly calculated the Sentencing
Guidelines range.64 The Supreme Court highlighted the
complimentary relationship between the Commission and the
district courts, stating:
[T]he presumption reflects the fact that, by the time an appeals
court is considering a within-Guidelines sentence on
review, both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing
Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the
proper sentence in the particular case. That double

57. See id. (“Because they are binding on all judges, this Court has
consistently held that the Guidelines have the force and effect of law.”).
58. 543 U.S. 220, (2005).
59. See id. at 227 (holding that the mandatory nature of the Sentencing
Guidelines is unconstitutional).
60. See id. (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines,
must . . . take them into account when sentencing.”); see also Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007) (stating that the district court must begin by
properly calculating the applicable Sentencing Guideline range).
61. See United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 838 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he
Guidelines still play an integral role in criminal sentencing.”).
62. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 347 (allowing appellate courts to review sentences
within the properly calculated range for reasonableness).
63. See id. at 341 (holding that the court of appeals may apply a presumption
of reasonableness).
64. See id. (stating that the presumption of reasonableness does not violate
the Sixth Amendment).
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determination significantly increases the likelihood that the
sentence is a reasonable one.
Further, the presumption reflects the nature of the Guidelineswriting task that Congress set for the Commission and the
manner in which the Commission carried out that task. In
instructing
both
the sentencing
judge and
the Commission what to do, Congress referred to the basic
sentencing objectives that the statute sets forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).65

Building upon the presumption in Rita, the Supreme Court in
Gall v. United States66 held that all federal appellate courts must
use a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard of review when
analyzing properly calculated sentences that district court judges
impose.67
In light of these two decisions, the appellate court reviewing a
district court judge’s sentence goes through a two-step process.68
First, the court must “ensure that the district court made no
significant procedural errors,” such as improperly calculating or
failing to calculate the Sentencing Guideline range.69 Second, the
court must “consider the sentence’s substantive reasonableness
under an abuse-of-discretion standard, taking into account the
totality of the circumstances, including the extent of a variance
from the Guidelines range.”70
To calculate the proper Sentencing Guidelines range, the
district court utilizes a six-step process for individual defendants
that culminates in the defendant’s offense level and criminal
history category (“CHC”).71 For example, an offense level of one
65. See id. at 347 (highlighting the complimentary relationship between the
Commission and the district court).
66. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007) (holding that the
appellate courts’ standard of review is abuse of discretion).
67. See id. at 59 (ensuring that the court of appeals gives proper deference
to the district court judge).
68. See HAINES ET AL., supra note 14, at 14 (explaining the two-step process
that appellate courts use).
69. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 39 (showing the first step the appellate court takes
to review the district court judge’s sentence).
70. See id. (showing the second step the appellate court takes to review the
district court judge’s sentence).
71. See HAINES ET AL., supra note 14, at 158 (listing the eight steps for
organizational defendants and six steps for individual defendants).
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coupled with a CHC of one, would result in zero to six months term
in prison.72 In contrast, an offense level of forty-three coupled with
a CHC of six, would result in a sentence of mandatory life in
prison.73 The higher the offense level and criminal history
category, the higher the sentence.74
Despite being advisory, the prevalence of the Sentencing
Guidelines throughout the sentencing process underscores the
important role they play.75
B. The Career Offender Sentencing Enhancement
1. The Creation and Application of 4B1.1 and 4B1.2
The SRA also specifically instructed the Commission to create
the career offender guideline.76 Title 28 § 994(h) of the United
States Code reads:
(h) The Commission shall assure that the guidelines specify a
sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum
term authorized for categories of defendants in which the
defendant is eighteen years old or older and-(1) has been
convicted of a felony that is-(A) a crime of violence; or (B) an
offense described in section 401 of the Controlled Substances
Act (21 U.S.C. 841), sections 1002(a), 1005, and 1009 of the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C.
952(a), 955, and 959), and chapter 705 of title 46; and (2) has
previously been convicted of two or more prior felonies, each of
which is-(A) a crime of violence; or (B) an offense described in
section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841),
sections 1002(a), 1005, and 1009 of the Controlled Substances
Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 952(a), 955, and 959), and
chapter 705 of title 46.77

72. See Annotated 2018 Chapter 5, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, (calculating the
guidelines range using the sentencing table) [https://perma.cc/Q9FW-PCKP].
73. See id. (calculating the guideline range using the sentencing table).
74. See id. (showing the sentencing table).
75. See HAINES ET AL., supra note 14, at 14 (showing the importance of the
Sentencing Guidelines despite their advisory status).
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2006) (instructing the Commission to punish
career criminals near the statutory maximum).
77. Id.
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This statutory directive would result in the promulgation of
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1 (“4B1.1”), the career
offender guideline, and the accompanying definitional section
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (“4B1.2”).78
The career offender guideline in 4B1.1(a) reads:
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least
eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the
instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction
is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior
felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense.79

Section 4B1.2(b) defines “controlled substance offense” as:
an offense under federal or state law, punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the
manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a
controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the
possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance)
with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or
dispense.80

If 4B1.1 applies, the “career offender’s criminal history
category in every case under this subsection shall be Category VI,”
and the offense level is set at or near the statutory maximum.81
Absent 4B1.1, the CHCs range from I to VI with the latter
imposing the longest sentences.82 Section 4B1.1 is one of only two
places in the Sentencing Guidelines where criminal history points
do not determine the CHC.83 Putting career criminals in Category
78. See HAINES ET AL., supra note 14, at 1445 (explaining the connection
between 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) and the career offender guideline).
79. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
80. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
81. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
82. See Annotated 2018 Chapter 5, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, (“The Criminal
History category is determined by the total criminal history points from chapter
four, Part A, except as provided in §§ 4B1.1 (Career Offender) and 4B1.4.”)
[https://perma.cc/SGV7-6JMC].
83. See id. (showing the increase in sentences from category I compared to
category VI).
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VI for criminal history and setting the offense level near the
statutory maximum accomplishes the Congressional directive of “a
term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized.”84
United States v. Holmes85 illustrates how the career offender
guideline is applied in practice.86 On November 18, 2014, a federal
grand jury indicted Holmes on three counts of distributing crack
cocaine and one count of distributing cocaine in violation of 21
U.S.C.
§§ 841(a) and 841(b)(1)(C).87
Holmes
accepted
responsibility and plead guilty to all four counts in the
indictment.88 Under Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the probation officer conducted a presentence
investigation and drafted a presentence report (“PSR”).89 In the
PSR, “the probation officer determined Holmes’ base offense level
to be [twenty-two]” and “calculated a criminal history score of
[nine], resulting in a criminal history category of IV.”90 The district
court reduced Holmes’ base level by three points, due to accepting
responsibility, which would put the final offense level at
[nineteen].91
However, because the instant offense was a controlled
substance offense, and Holmes had two previous controlled
substance offenses, the officer classified Holmes as a career
offender under 4B1.1.92 Holmes objected to the career offender
classification and the district court overruled the objection

84. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2006).
85. See United States v. Holmes, 647 F. App’x 1014, 1017 (11th Cir. 2016)
(holding that the defendant’s two prior drug convictions qualify as predicate
offenses).
86. With Mr. Holmes’ permission, his case will be used to illustrate how the
sentencing enhancement is applied.
87. See Holmes, 647 F. App’x at 1015 (charging the defendant with four
counts of cocaine and crack cocaine offenses).
88. See Initial Brief for Appellant at 4, United States v. Holmes, 647 F. App’x
1014 (11th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-12072) (pleading guilty to four counts of cocaine and
crack cocaine offenses).
89. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)-(d) (requiring a presentence investigation and
presentence report).
90. Initial Brief for Appellant at 5, United States v. Holmes, 647 F. App’x
1014 (11th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-12072).
91. See id. at 18 (reducing Holmes’ base level offense).
92. See id. at 5 (classifying Holmes as a career offender).
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confirming the classification.93 The career offender guideline
“brought Holmes’ offense level to [thirty-two]” and raised his CHC
to VI.94 Based on the PSR, the probation officer recommended a
range of imprisonment between 151–188 months.95 The district
court adopted the recommendation and sentenced Holmes’ to 180
months in prison.96
Without the career offender classification, calculating Holmes’
sentence using the initial base offense level of [nineteen] and a
CHC of IV, Holmes would have been given a recommended
Sentencing Guidelines range of forty-six to fifty-seven months.97
This level of drastic increase in sentence is typical of defendant’s
sentenced under 4B1.1.98 Holmes having “controlled substance
offenses” is also typical, with a vast majority of defendants
sentenced under 4B1.1 being drug traffickers.99 This case outlines
how the career offender guideline is applied in actual practice.
2. The Difficulty the Commission Faces in Amending 4B1.1
In recent years, the Commission has repeatedly asked
Congress to fix issues with the career offender guideline.100 While
Congress gives the Commission expansive authority to amend the
Sentencing Guidelines, they must adhere to congressional
directives.101

93. See id. at 6 (overruling the defendant’s objection to the classification).
94. See id. at 5 (bringing Holmes’ offense level to 32 pursuant to USSG
§ 4B1.1(b)(3)).
95. See id. at 6 (recommending a prison sentence based on the sentencing
table).
96. See id. (sentencing the defendant to fifteen years in prison).
97. See Annotated 2018 Chapter 5, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N (calculating the
guideline range using the sentencing table) [https://perma.cc/42YP-JCXE].
98. See QUICK FACTS CAREER OFFENDERS 1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)
(enhancing defendants’ sentences by raising their CHC and base level).
99. See id. (identifying controlled substance offenses as typical for drug
traffickers).
100. See REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CAREER OFFENDER SENTENCE 26 (U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N 2016) (recommending that Congress change the career offender
guideline).
101. See United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 753 (1997) (forcing the
Commission to follow their congressional directive).
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The Supreme Court considered this interplay in United States
v. LaBonte102 when defining the phrase “maximum term
authorized” as it appears in 28 U.S.C. § 994(h).103 Congress
directed the Commission to sentence certain offenders “at or near
the maximum term authorized” when adult defendants commit
“their third felony drug offense or violent crime.”104 In Amendment
506, the Commission defined “offense statutory maximum” as “the
maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the offense of
conviction that is a crime of violence or controlled substance
offense, not including any increase in that maximum term under a
sentencing enhancement provision that applies because of the
defendant’s prior criminal record . . . .”105 The Department of
Justice argued that the maximum term authorized for the offense
of conviction included “any applicable statutory sentencing
enhancement.”106
The Department of Justice further argued that the maximum
term authorized for the offense of conviction included “any
applicable statutory sentencing enhancement.”107 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court found that the Commission could not substantially
deviate from the Congressional directive set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(h), and that the “maximum term authorized” included any
applicable statutory enhancements.108 The Supreme Court
reasoned that while Congress gave the Commission “significant
discretion in formulating guidelines,” that discretion “must bow”
to specific Congressional directives.109 Labonte ties the

102. See id. (holding “maximum term authorized” to include all applicable
sentencing enhancements).
103. See id. at 757–58 (weighing the congressional directive with the
Commission’s general authority).
104. Id. at 752.
105. See U.S. SENT’G. GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 506 (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 1994) (amending USSG § 4B1.1 cmt. n.2).
106. LaBonte, 520 U.S. at 752 (1997).
107. LaBonte, 520 U.S. at 752.
108. See id. at 757–58 (weighing the congressional directive with the
Commission’s general authority).
109. Id. at 757.
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Commission’s hands, preventing substantive deviation from
§ 994(h) without Congressional action.110
III. An Explanation and Critique of Each Argument in the Circuit
Split over the definition of Controlled Substance in 4B1.2
A. Where Each Circuit Stands
Federal appellate courts (“Circuits”) are currently split on the
definition of “controlled substance” in the Sentencing
Guidelines.111 The Second, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and possibly
Tenth Circuits have defined “controlled substance” using solely the
drugs listed in the federal Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”).112 On
the other side of the split are the Fourth, Seventh, and possibly the
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, which have defined “controlled
substance” using federal or state law.113 Understanding the
reasoning behind each Circuit’s position will shed light on the

110. See id. at 756 (restricting the Commission to their congressional
directive).
111. See United States v. Ward, 972 F.3d 364, 375 (4th Cir. 2020) (splitting
from the other circuits).
112. See United States v. Townsend, 897 F.3d 66, 68 (2d Cir. 2018) (finding
that the term “controlled substance” in § 4B1.2(b) refers exclusively to those
substances in the CSA); United States v. Gomez-Alvarez, 781 F.3d 787, 793 (5th
Cir. 2015) (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit and stating that “controlled
substance” refers to substances listed in the federal Controlled Substance
Act); United States v. Sanchez-Garcia, 642 F.3d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 2011) (using
federally defined “controlled substance” when applying the categorical approach);
United States v. Leal-Vega, 680 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that
“controlled substance” means drugs listed in the federal Controlled Substance
Act); United States v. Abdeljawad, 794 F. App’x 745, 748 (10th Cir. 2019)
(nonprecedential) (signaling agreement with the Ninth Circuit in federally
defining “controlled substance”); see also United States v. Walker, 858 F.3d 196,
200 n.4 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting that “drug trafficking offense” under U.S. SENT’G
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) is “substantively
identical” to U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018)).
113. See Ward, 972 F.3d at 372 (defining “controlled substance” using federal
or state law); United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642, 654 (7th Cir. 2020) (same);
United States v. Peraza, 754 F. App’x 908, 910 (11th Cir. 2018) (nonprecedential)
(same); United States v. Smith, 681 F. App’x 483, 488 (6th Cir. 2017)
(nonprecedential) (same).
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solution to the problem.114 The arguments for and against federally
defining “controlled substance” can be broken down into four
categories: (1) 4B1.2(b)’s plain meaning,; (2) the Jerome
Presumption; (3) the lack of internal cross referencing; and (4) the
dependence on state law in violation of Taylor v. United States.115
1. The Fourth Circuit’s Plain Meaning Framework
Because the Supreme Court has instructed that the starting
point for statutory interpretation is the plain meaning of the
statute, the analysis begins with the Fourth Circuit’s position.116
In United States v. Ward,117 the Fourth Circuit employed a plain
meaning framework to define “controlled substance.”118 A plain
meaning analysis “[assumes] that the ordinary meaning of the
statutory language accurately expresses the legislative
purpose.”119 Turning to the plain meaning of 4B1.2(b), the
provision reads: “[t]he term controlled substance offense means an
offense under federal or state law.”120 Below, in Ward, the Fourth
Circuit meticulously analyzed the language of 4B1.2(b) to define
“controlled substance”:
First, we note that only an “offense under federal or state law”
may trigger the enhancement. An “offense” is, of course, “a
114. See Julian W. Smith, Note, Evidence of Ambiguity: The Effect of Circuit
Splits on the Interpretation of Federal Criminal Law, 16 SUFFOLK J. OF TRIAL &
APP. ADVOC. 79, 93 (2011) (“[C]ourts may also look to other circuit courts to help
their analyses of interpretation. . .”).
115. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (holding that the
term “burglary” has a definition independent from state law).
116. See Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 376
(2013) (quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251
(2010)) (stating that courts should begin their analysis with the text of the
statute).
117. See United States v. Ward, 972 F.3d 364, 371 (4th Cir. 2020) (finding
that the defendant’s prior convictions categorically qualify as “controlled
substance offenses”).
118. See id. at 371–72 (defining “controlled substance” as any offense arising
under federal or state law).
119. See Marx, 568 U.S. at 376 (quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.
Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010)) (internal quotations omitted).
120. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)
(internal citations omitted).
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breach of law.” The noun, “offense,” is then modified by a
prepositional phrase: “under federal or state law.” The
preposition “under” means “[b]eneath the rule or domination of;
subject to.” So to satisfy the ordinary meaning of “offense,” there
must be a violation or crime “subject to” either “federal or state
law.”121

In interpreting the provision, the court relied heavily on the
use of dictionaries to find the ordinary meaning of the words.122
The court ultimately found federal and state “controlled substance
offenses” to fall within the language of the provision.123
2. The Second Circuit’s Usage of the Jerome Presumption
In United States v. Townsend,124 the Second Circuit used the
Jerome Presumption to define the phrase “controlled substance” in
4B1.2(b).125 The Jerome Presumption is a general rule that states
that the application of federal law does not depend on state law
unless Congress plainly indicates otherwise.126 As the Second
Circuit noted, the only reason the Jerome Presumption and other
methods of interpretation are applicable is because the Sentencing
Guidelines are ambiguous in 4B1.2(b).127 Even though the
Sentencing Guidelines are not federal statutes found in the United
States Code, they are given the force of law and so the presumption
is applicable.128

121. Ward, 972 F.3d at 370 (internal citations omitted).
122. See id. at 380 (Gregory, C.J., concurring) (taking issue with the
majority’s use of dictionaries).
123. See id. at 372 (majority opinion) (stating a predicate offense can arise
under federal or state law).
124. See United States v. Townsend, 897 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding
that “controlled substance refers solely to those substances listed in the CSA).
125. See id. at 71 (using the Jerome Presumption to resolve the ambiguity in
the provision).
126. Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943).
127. See Townsend, 897 F.3d at 69 (“If the Guidelines are clear, there is little
more to do; if they are ambiguous, however, the courts have crafted an
interpretive scheme that honors our federal sentencing system while preserving
the fairness owed to the defendant.”).
128. See United States v. Kirvan, 86 F.3d 309, 311 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that
the Guidelines have the same level of authority as federal statutes).
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The Second Circuit applied the Jerome Presumption to
4B1.2(b) and found that the term “controlled substance” refers
solely to those substances listed in the CSA.129 The court reasoned
that “federal law is the interpretive anchor to resolve the
ambiguity at issue.”130 The court further stated that allowing state
law to control would leave the Sentencing Guidelines up to each
individual state, defeating the entire point of the categorical
approach.131 The Seventh Circuit disagreed.132
3. The Seventh Circuit’s Issue with the Lack of Internal Cross
References in 4B1.2
In United States v. Ruth,133 the Seventh Circuit directly
addressed the Second Circuit’s position in Townsend and rejected
their usage of the Jerome Presumption, finding that 4B1.2(b) can
refer to substances not listed in the CSA.134 On top of taking a
similar approach to the Fourth Circuit in their reasoning, utilizing
the plain meaning of 4B1.2(b) to come to their conclusion, the court
also relied on the lack of internal cross references in the
provision.135 To the Seventh Circuit, this was the “fatal flaw” in
limiting the term “controlled substance” to only those substances
listed in the CSA.136 As the court recognized, the Sentencing
Commission has the ability to cross reference or directly

129. See Townsend, 897 F.3d at 71 (using the Jerome Presumption to define
“controlled substance” in U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(b) (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2018)).
130. Id.
131. See id. (stating that allowing state law to control would defeat the
purpose of the categorical approach).
132. See United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642, 654 (7th Cir. 2020) (rejecting
the Second Circuit’s position).
133. See id. (finding that the defendant’s Illinois drug conviction was a
predicate offense under U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(b) (U.S SENT’G
COMM’N 2018)).
134. See id. (stating that U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(b) (U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N 2018) refers both to federal and to state law).
135. See id. at 652 (noting the lack of internal cross-referencing in U.S. SENT’G
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)).
136. Id. at 651.
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incorporate federal statutory definitions when it wants to.137 For
example, if the Sentencing Commission wanted the term
“controlled substance” to refer solely to those substances listed in
the CSA, it could have incorporated that provision by reference
into 4B1.2(b).138 According to proponents of the Jerome
Presumption, this is a significant omission that lends merit to the
argument that convictions involving substances not listed in the
CSA are not sufficient to serve as predicate offenses for sentencing
purposes.139
In the same definitional section of the career offender
guideline, the Commission defined “crime of violence” by
incorporating 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).140 Below
is both 4B1.2(a)(2) and 4B1.2(b):
(a) The term “crime of violence” means any offense under
federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, that-(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another, or
(2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping,
aggravated assault, a forcible sex offense, robbery, arson,
extortion, or the use or unlawful possession of a firearm
described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or explosive material as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).141
(b) The term “controlled substance offense” means an offense
under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture,
import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled
substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a
controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to
manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.142

137. See id. (taking the omission of incorporating the CSA as dispositive).
138. See id. (showing the ease in which the Commission could have federally
defined “controlled substance”).
139. See id. (showing that the lack of cross-referencing means state law can
control).
140. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018) (incorporating federal statutes into the definition section).
141. Id. § 4B1.2(a)(2).
142. Id. § 4B1.2(b).
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The close proximity between “crime of violence,” which
incorporates two federal statutes, and “controlled substance,”
which lacks any internal cross referencing, strengthens the case
for substances not listed in the CSA being able to act as predicate
offenses.143 Furthermore, when the Sentencing Guidelines were
first introduced in 1985, the Sentencing Commission did
incorporate the CSA into 4B1.2(b).144 Within a few years, the
Sentencing Commission substantively amended the text of the
provision to what it reads today, with no incorporation or cross
referencing.145 The lack of cross referencing is persuasive, but is
directly at odds with the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v.
United States.146
4. How the Supreme Court’s Rationale in Taylor v. United States
Aids in Interpretation
In Taylor, the Supreme Court was tasked with defining the
word “burglary” in 8 U.S.C. § 924(e).147 In defining “burglary”, the
Court had to grapple with using individual state definitions or
defining the word in a federal context independent of state law.148
Ultimately, the Court chose to define “burglary” independent of
state law, in spite of the enhancement not expressly defining
burglary.149 The Supreme Court reasoned that Congress could not
have possibly intended the definition of burglary to depend on
state law and stressed the importance of a uniform definition of
“burglary” separate from the varying states’ criminal codes.150

143. See United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642, 654 (7th Cir. 2020) (noting how
close “controlled substance” was to a definition that was cross-referenced).
144. See id. (showing that the Commission has incorporated the CSA
previously).
145. See id. (comparing the previous version of the provision with the current
version).
146. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
147. See id. at 599 (defining the word burglary).
148. See id. (showing the difficulties of applying the varying state law
definitions of burglary).
149. See id. at 602 (creating the categorical approach).
150. See id. at 592 (reasoning that Congress could not have intended to let
various state laws serve as definitions).
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The decision in Taylor created the categorical approach.151 To
determine whether a defendant’s previous state law convictions
are predicate offenses for purposes of the career offender guideline,
courts employ the categorical approach.152 Initially, the categorical
approach was used for violent felonies in the Armed Career
Criminal Act, but “[a]ll of the circuits have held that the same
categorical approach applies to the [Sentencing] [G]uidelines.”153
The categorical approach matches the “statutory elements of the
prior conviction” with the “generic offense” in the Sentencing
Guidelines.154
Several circuits have adopted the reasoning in Taylor that
created the categorical approach when defining “controlled
substance.”155 The reasoning in Taylor mirrors that of the
Sentencing Guidelines themselves—uniformity.156 To quote
Taylor, “[i]t seems to us to be implausible that Congress intended
the meaning of “[controlled substance]” for purposes of
[4B1.2(b)] to depend on the definition adopted by the state of
conviction” and “[w]e think that [“controlled substance”]
in [4B1.2(b)] must have some uniform definition independent of
the labels employed by the various states’ criminal codes.”157 When
151. See id. at 602 (creating the categorical approach).
152. See id. (making courts apply the categorical approach).
153. HAINES ET AL., supra note 14, at 1456 (internal quotations omitted).
154. Id.
155. See United States v. Townsend, 897 F.3d 66, 68 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding
that the term “controlled substance” in U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 4B1.2(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) refers exclusively to those substances in the
CSA); United States v. Gomez-Alvarez, 781 F.3d 787, 793 (5th Cir. 2015)
(agreeing with the Ninth Circuit and stating that “controlled substance” refers to
substances listed in the federal Controlled Substance Act); United States v.
Sanchez-Garcia, 642 F.3d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 2011) (using federally defined
“controlled substance” when applying the categorical approach); United States v.
Leal-Vega, 680 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that “controlled
substance” means drugs listed in the federal Controlled Substance Act); United
States v. Abdeljawad, 794 F. App’x 745, 748 (10th Cir. 2019) (nonprecedential)
(signaling agreement with the Ninth Circuit in federally defining “controlled
substance”); see also United States v. Walker, 858 F.3d 196, 200 n.4 (4th Cir.
2017) (noting that “drug trafficking offense” under § 2L1.2 is “substantively
identical” to § 4B1.2(b)).
156. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018) (showing that the goal of the Guidelines is reasonable uniformity in
sentencing).
157. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590, 592 (1990).
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confronting this exact issue, Chief Judge Gregory of the Fourth
Circuit stated: “[s]omething went wrong here. Rather than follow
the rationale of the Supreme Court, the majority adopts the very
approach Taylor addressed and rejected.”158 Allowing standalone
state law to act as predicate offenses would be in direct conflict
with the reasoning set forth in Taylor.159
B. Critiquing the Fourth and Seventh Circuit’s Positions
1. The Issue with the Fourth Circuit’s Interpretation
While both the Fourth and Seventh Circuit’s arguments are
persuasive, they possess fatal flaws.160 Beginning with the Fourth
Circuit, a plain meaning analysis poses several substantive
issues.161 The issue with adopting the plain meaning of 4B1.2(b) is
that the phrase “controlled substance offense” lacks an ordinary
meaning, because the word “controlled” has a technical definition
and is a term of art.162 Justice Scalia, one of the largest proponents
of textualism, only applied the plain meaning framework to nontechnical words.163 The word “counterfeit” is an example of a nontechnical word that has a plain meaning because any ordinary
person reading that word would understand it to mean fake.164
Unlike “counterfeit,” the word “controlled” lacks such an ordinary

158. United States v. Ward, 972 F.3d 364, 384 (4th Cir. 2020) (Gregory, C.J.,
concurring).
159. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 592 (requiring uniformity in federal law).
160. See Ward, 972 F.3d at 378 (Gregory, C.J., concurring) (“This is a
mistake.”); see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CAREER
OFFENDER SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS app. A-9 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2016)
(explaining why § 4B1.2 is not cross-referenced).
161. See Ward, 972 F.3d at 378 (Gregory, C.J., concurring) (reasoning that the
majority’s plain meaning approach is flawed).
162. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 259 (2006) (“Control is a term of
art in the [Controlled Substances Act].”).
163. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“In the search for statutory meaning, we give nontechnical words and
phrases their ordinary meaning.”) (emphasis added).
164. See United States v. Ward, 972 F.3d 364, 379 (4th Cir. 2020) (Gregory,
C.J., concurring) (showing that counterfeit can be defined as fake).
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reading and cannot stand on its own without context.165 The nature
of the word “controlled” altogether precludes a plain meaning
analysis.166 Along with being a word lacking ordinary meaning,
“controlled” is also a passive past participle, which begs the
question—controlled by whom?167 Compare the Fourth Circuit’s
analysis with the Second Circuit’s below:
Although a “controlled substance offense” includes an offense
“under federal or state law,” that does not also mean that
the substance at issue may be controlled under federal or state
law. To include substances controlled under only state law, the
definition should read “. . . a controlled substance under federal
or state law.” But it does not. It may be tempting to transitively
apply the “or state law” modifier from the term “controlled
substance offense” to the term “controlled substance.”168

The stark contrast between the two Circuits’ interpretations
makes it clear that there are several ways to read the text of the
provision and, because reasonable minds could differ on which
interpretation is correct, the language of 4B1.2(b) is ambiguous.169
2. How the Commentary to 4B1.2 Can Resolve the Ambiguity in
the Provision
The overall purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines, and the
commentary accompanying 4B1.2(b), can serve to resolve some of
the ambiguity in defining “controlled.”170 First, the goal of the
Sentencing Guidelines is to create “reasonable uniformity in

165. See id. (Gregory, C.J., concurring) (highlighting the difference between
“counterfeit” and “controlled”); see also Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 538,
135 S. Ct. 1074, 191 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2015) (“[A]lthough dictionary definitions of the
words ‘tangible’ and ‘object’ bear consideration, they are not dispositive of the
meaning of ‘tangible object’ in § 1519.”).
166. See Ward, 972 F.3d at 379 (Gregory, C.J., concurring) (“One cannot
appeal to any plain meaning of the term ‘controlled’ to resolve this question.”).
167. See id. (stating that because of the nature of the word “controlled,” it is
unclear to whom the provision refers).
168. United States v. Townsend, 897 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 2018).
169. See id. (stating that the language of § 4B1.2(b) is ambiguous).
170. See United States v. Ward, 972 F.3d 364, 381–83 (4th Cir. 2020)
(Gregory, C.J., concurring) (using both the goal of the Guidelines and the
commentary to define “controlled substance offense”).
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sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed
for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders.”171
With uniformity in mind, the next step is to look to the
commentary.172 The Supreme Court has held that the commentary
accompanying the Sentencing Guidelines is authoritative and
binding unless it is plainly erroneous or violates the
Constitution.173 The commentary in 4B1.2(b) reads:
Section 4B1.2 defines “controlled substances offense” to
include (1) unlawful possession of a listed chemical in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841( [c] )(1); (2) unlawful possession of controlled
substances manufacturing equipment in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 843(a)(6); (3) maintenance of a place for facilitating a drug
offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856; and (4) use of a
communications facility in aid of a drug offense in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).174

While this list is non-exhaustive, it is insightful.175 The
commentary and the main text should read harmoniously.176 By
listing four federal statutes when describing what kind of offenses
trigger the enhancement, the Commission implicitly defined
“controlled substance” in a federal context.177 When writing the
language of the commentary in 4B1.2(b), the Commission chose to
only reference federal statutes.178 If standalone state law could act

171. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 3, pt. A1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
172. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (“[T]he commentary
represent the most accurate indications of how the Commission deems that the
guidelines should be applied . . . .”).
173. See id. at 44 (stating that the commentary to the Guidelines is binding
on courts).
174. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018).
175. See Ward, 972 F.3d at 379 (Gregory, C.J., concurring) (using the listed
statutes in the commentary to help understand the Guidelines).
176. See Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 100 (2012) (“The text
of 33 U.S.C. § 906(c), standing alone, admits of either interpretation. But ‘our task
is to fit, if possible, all parts into a harmonious whole.’”) (internal citation
omitted).
177. See id. (reasoning that the sections should read harmoniously).
178. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2018) (listing four federal statutes).

234

28 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 205 (2021)

as a predicate offense then one would expect to see a more inclusive
list in the commentary.179
The plain meaning of the guideline provision may contradict
the purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines and the commentary that
supports federally defining “controlled substance” with “or state”
being explicitly written into the provision.180 Unlike “controlled,”
which poses its own unique interpretive issues, the phrase “or
state” clearly provides for state law offenses.181 Any reading of the
provision that does not allow state law offenses to act as predicate
offenses would be an erroneous reading of 4B1.2(b).182
In interpreting this phrase, it is already clear that state law
can act as a predicate offense, shown by the usage of the categorical
approach, so the only real question left is whether solely state law
can act as a predicate offense.183 It is important to note that a
federal reading of 4B1.2(b) does not raise concerns with “or state”
being read out of the provision because, as Chief Judge Gregory
notes in Ward, federally defining “controlled substance” still allows
for state law drug offenses as long as those substances are listed
in the CSA.184 Because the text of the Guidelines are ambiguous,
and the commentary does not fully resolve that ambiguity, the
Fourth Circuit’s plain meaning analysis is “unnecessary and
unjustified.”185

179. See United States v. Ward, 972 F.3d 364, 379 (4th Cir. 2020) (Gregory,
C.J., concurring) (noting that if state law could control, the Commission would
likely have included it in the list).
180. See id. at 370 (reasoning that “or state” would be read out of § 4B1.2(b)
if it was federally defined).
181. See id. (noting that the language of the provision allows for state law
offenses).
182. See id. (rejecting any definition of “controlled substance” that does not
include state law).
183. See Ward, 972 F.3d at 379 (Gregory, C.J., concurring) (understanding
that the categorical approach already allows for certain state law to trigger the
enhancement).
184. See id. at 383 n.7 (“On my reading, a state law offense could trigger
enhancement so long as the substance is one controlled under the federal
schedules.”).
185. Id. at 375.
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3. The Issue with the Seventh Circuit’s Lack of Internal CrossReferences Argument
The issue with the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in United States
v. Ruth is that it ignores the Commission’s explicit explanation as
to why the provision is not internally cross referenced.186 In a
report to Congress about the career offender enhancement, the
Commission went over every substantive amendment to 4B1.2.187
In 1988, 4B1.2 defined “controlled substance offense” as “an
offense identified in 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 845b, 856, 952(a), 955,
955(a), 959, and similar offenses.”188 The commentary to 4B1.2
explained that “[c]ontrolled substance offense includes any federal
or state offense that is substantially similar to any of those listed
in subsection (2) of the guideline.”189 In 1989, the Commission
removed both the phrase “substantially similar” and the internal
cross references in 4B1.2, stating:
With respect to the term “controlled substance offense,” the
Commission sought a definition that was well-established in
legislative history and that had the prospect of cohesive case
law development. The Commission concluded that the
definition from 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) would be preferable to the
previous definition . . . Additionally, practical concerns led the
Commission to note that “the listing of offenses by section
number will necessitate the continuous review of new drug
laws, both in terms of their substantive similarity to those
already listed in the guideline and simply in terms of the
revised section numbers.”190

The practical concerns are obvious, as listing every offense
applicable to 4B1.2 would create an unworkable definition.191
Turning to the language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which defines
“controlled substance offense,” the statute reads:

186. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CAREER OFFENDER
SENTENCE app. A-9 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2016) (explaining why the Commission
amended § 4B1.2).
187. See id. (listing the amendments to U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 4B1.2(b) (U.S SENT’G COMM’N 2018) over the years).
188. Id. at app. A-6.
189. Id. at app. A-7 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 77.
191. See id. (stating that practical concerns led to the amendment).
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(i) an offense under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.
801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act
(21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46 for which a
maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is
prescribed by law; or
(ii) an offense under State law, involving manufacturing,
distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or
distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of
the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a
maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is
prescribed by law.192

Not only does this definition provide cross references to the
CSA, but it also mirrors the language of the congressional directive
set forth in § 994(h).193 Moreover, the Commission also discussed
the deletion of the term “substantially similar” from the provision,
noting that while the language was removed, “[t]he 1997
amendment largely restored the effect, if not the wording, of the
language that was deleted in 1989.”194 The reasoning behind
amending the career offender guideline, and the Commission’s own
explanation, resolves the Seventh Circuit’s issue with the lack of
cross references in 4B1.2.
IV. The Significance of the Career Offender Designation
A. The Issues Confronting the United States Prison Systems
Aside from the circuit split, the career offender guideline also
raises several public policy concerns in the federal prison
system.195 Before addressing those concerns, it is necessary to
assess the landscape of the United States Prison system as a
whole.

192. 18 U.S.C. § 924.
193. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (requiring that substances in the CSA be
penalized).
194. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CAREER OFFENDER
SENTENCE app. A-7 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
195. See QUICK FACTS CAREER OFFENDERS 1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).

SENSLESS SENTENCING

237

The United States currently holds over 2.3 million
incarcerated people in state and federal prison.196 One hundred
and thirteen million adults have “an immediate family member
who has been to prison or jail.”197 After release from prison and
return to civilian life, formerly incarcerated people face the
collateral consequences of their conviction, including restrictions
on voting, housing, education and employment.198 Prison touches
nearly all aspects of American life, as there are roughly the same
number four-year college graduates as people with criminal
records.199
Narrowing the scope to the federal prison system, incarcerated
individuals, and the nation at large, face significant hurdles in
overcoming the lasting effects of the ongoing “War on Drugs.”200
Since Congress enacted the SRA in 1984, drug offenses have
increased by over 1200%.201 The “War on Drugs” has also costed an
estimated one trillion dollars.202 “In 2015, the federal government
spent an estimated $9.2 million every day to incarcerate people
charged with drug related offenses.”203 It comes as no surprise that
non-violent drug offenses are a “defining feature of the federal

196. See Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie
2020,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Mar.
24,
2020),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html (reporting the statistics
behind U.S. prisons) [https://perma.cc/D5CM-ZMDL].
197. Id.
198. See id. (listing the collateral consequences formerly incarcerated people
face).
199. See Matthew Friedman, Just Facts: As Many Americans Have Criminal
Records as College Diplomas, BRENNAN CTR. (Nov. 17, 2015) (comparing the
amount of college graduates with people with criminal records)
[https://perma.cc/DLG6-JJ42].
200. See Claire Suddath, The War on Drugs, TIME (Mar. 25, 2009) (showing
how the U.S. government has spent trillions of dollars on the war on drugs)
[https://perma.cc/GMA8-794C].
201. See Vicki Waye & Paul Marcus, Australia and the United States: Two
Common Criminal Justice Systems Uncommonly at Odds, Part 2, 18 TUL. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 335, 373 (2010) (noting that drug offense rates have gone up by 1200%
since 1980).
202. See Betsy Pearl, Ending the War on Drugs: By the Numbers, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (June 27, 2018, 9:00 AM) (estimating the cost of the war on drugs
to be around $1 trillion) [https://perma.cc/3RHM-KBAA].
203. Id.
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penitentiary.”204 Out of the 226,000 inmates in federal prison,
76,000 were convicted of drug offenses.205 In recent years there
have been bipartisan efforts by Congress to reduce the amount of
drug offenders being held in federal prison.206
Outside of the overwhelming amount of drug offenders
currently in federal prison, the incarceration of individuals due to
drug related offenses poses other concerns.207 Studies show that
“[i]ncarcerating people for drug related offenses” has “little impact
on substance abuse rates.”208 To add to the ineffectiveness of
incarceration, significant racial disparities exist between Black
Americans and their white peers.209 With equal substance usage
rates between the two demographics, “Black Americans are nearly
six times more likely to be incarcerated for drug-related
offenses.”210 For comparison, “the average [B]lack defendant
convicted of a drug offense will serve nearly the same amount of
time (58.7 months) as a white defendant would for a violent crime
(61.7 months).211
B. The Severity of Sentencing 4B1.1 Imposes
The career offender guideline is directly tied to several of
issues present in the federal prison system. To begin, enhancement
is disproportionately used—seventy-eight percent of those
sentenced in “controlled substance offenses” compared to twenty-

204. Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 196.
205. See id. (charting the number of offenders and offense type of prisoners in
the federal penitentiary).
206. See King et al., How to Reduce the Federal Prison Population, URB. INST.,
RLKM (noting that there have been recent efforts to lower the number of drug
offenders in the federal penitentiary) [https://perma.cc/X5F4-].
207. See Pearl, supra note 202 (going over the issues that arise when people
are incarcerated due to drug related offenses).
208. Id.
209. See id. (highlighting the growing disparity in sentencing between Black
and white Americans).
210. Id.
211. Id.
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two percent regarding “crimes of violence.”212 Drastic increases in
sentencing numbers are not uncommon under 4B1.1.213 Almost
sixty percent of career offenders are Black.214 Nearly half of all
career offenders in 2018 saw an average increase in offense level
“from [twenty-three] to [thirty-one] and the average CHC
increased from IV to VI.”215 The Commission itself notes that the
career offender guideline “resulted in some of the most severe
penalties imposed under the guidelines.”216 Moreover, the average
sentence for a career offender in 2018 was one hundred and fifty
months.217 As a result of the enhanced sentences created by 4B1.1,
career offenders account for over eleven percent of the federal
prison population, despite being only “2.5% of the federal
sentencing docket.”218
Allowing standalone state law to act as predicate offenses
would worsen each issue previously discussed. States are well
within their constitutional rights to prohibit substances that are
not penalized under federal law.219 The Fourth Circuit’s approach
to 4B1.2 highlights the problem with a lack of a federal definition
for a “controlled substance offense.” Take Salvinorin A, a substance
the federal drug schedule never intended to penalize but is listed
on Virginia’s Schedule I.220 In fact, there are forty-two substances
on Virginia’s Schedule I that, like Salvinorin A, are not present on

212. Erica Zunkel & Alison Siegler, The Federal Judiciary’s Role in Drug Law
Reform in an Era of Congressional Dysfunction, 18 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 283, 323
(2020).
213. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, QUICK FACTS CAREER OFFENDERS 1 (2018)
(increasing most defendants sentences substantially) [hereinafter QUICK FACTS].
214. See id. (stating that 59.7% of career offenders are Black).
215. Id.
216. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FED. CRIM. JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE
GOALS OF REFORM 133 (Nov. 1, 2004) [hereinafter FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES
SENTENCING].
217. See QUICK FACTS, supra note 213, at 1 (noting substantially increased
average sentences).
218. ZUNKEL & SIEGLER, supra note 212, at 324 (2020).
219. See United States v. Ward, 972 F.3d 364, 383 (4th Cir. 2020) (stating that
states can regulate any substance they deem impermissible).
220. See VA. CODE § 54.1-3446 (2021) (listing Salvorin A as a Schedule I
substance).
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any federal drug schedules.221 Under the Fourth Circuit’s
framework, so long as the “controlled substance” is “punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” and that state law
prohibits “the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or
dispensing” of the controlled substance, or “prohibit[s] the
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to
manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense,” the
substance can trigger the career offender sentencing
enhancement.222 This means that in Virginia alone, forty-two
substances carry, in the words of the Commission, “the most severe
penalties under the guideline” in spite of federal law not penalizing
the substances.223
V. The Supreme Court Should Handle the Circuit Split by
Federally Defining Controlled Substance Offenses
A. Why the Supreme Court Must Grant Certiorari
The Supreme Court must grant certiorari on the circuit split.
Not only does the allowance of standalone state law offenses run
afoul of the Court’s decision in Taylor vs. United States, but it also
raises several public policy concerns.224 As it stands, a relatively
small number of defendants account for over a tenth of the federal
prison system population, and adding to that number by allowing
standalone state law offenses to carry the same penalty as those
penalized under the CSA would be a mistake.225 Due to the
Commission currently lacking a quorum, this is an issue that only
the Supreme Court can resolve.226 The Nine must grant certiorari
and federally define “controlled substance offense.”
221. See Ward, 972 F.3d at 384 (noting Virginia law may contain 52
substances not penalized under federal law on its drug schedules).
222. Id.
223. See FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING supra note 216, at 133
(noting 42 substances have severe penalties under Fourth Circuit).
224. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 592 (1990) (requiring
uniformity in federal law).
225. See United States v. Ward, 972 F.3d 364, 384 (4th Cir. 2020) (noting
effect of uniformity in federal law).
226. See Q, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, (last visited Nov. 26,
2020) (defining quorum) [https://perma.cc/DED2-J59L]; see also About the
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B. Controlled Substance Offense Should Be Federally Defined
When the Supreme Court decides to grant certiorari, the
Court should hold that the term “controlled substance offense”
refers solely to substances listed in the CSA.227 The arguments on
the other side of the circuit split possess fatal flaws, with the
Fourth Circuit’s plain meaning analysis being unjustified, and the
Seventh Circuit’s issue with the lack of internal cross references
resolved.228 The Jerome Presumption, while around eighty years
old, provides a doctrinally sound avenue upon which the Court may
rest their decision.229
Taylor also presents another way in which the Court can
define the term “controlled substance offense” by using the
reasoning behind the categorical approach and the need for federal
law to be uniform.230 Coupling the Jerome Presumption with the
reasoning in Taylor, the Supreme Court can resolve the circuit
split.231

Commissioners, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION (listing the current
members of the Sentencing Commission) [https://perma.cc/4AQ9-VH7W].
227. See United States v. Townsend, 897 F.3d 66, 68 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding
that the term “controlled substance” in 4B1.2(b) refers exclusively to those
substances in the CSA); United States v. Gomez-Alvarez, 781 F.3d 787, 793 (5th
Cir. 2015) (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit and stating “controlled substance”
refers to substances listed in the federal Controlled Substance Act); United States
v. Sanchez-Garcia, 642 F.3d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 2011) (using federally defined
“controlled substance” when applying the categorical approach); United States v.
Leal-Vega, 680 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding “controlled substance” to
mean drugs listed in the federal Controlled Substance Act); United States v.
Abdeljawad, 794 F. App’x 745, 748 (10th Cir. 2019) (nonprecedential) (signaling
agreement with the Ninth Circuit in federally defining “controlled substance”);
see also United States v. Walker, 858 F.3d 196, 200 n.4 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting
that “drug trafficking offense” under Section 2L1.2 is “substantively identical”
to Section 4B1.2(b)).
228. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (requiring substances in the CSA be penalized);
United States v. Ward, 972 F.3d 364, 375 (4th Cir. 2020) (reasoning the plain
meaning analysis “unnecessary”).
229. See Townsend, 897 F.3d at 71 (using the Jerome Presumption to federally
define “controlled substance offence”).
230. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (defining burglary
federally).
231. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (reasoning federal law should have a uniform
definition of burglary); Townsend, 897 F.3d at 71 (reasoning “controlled substance
offense” should have a uniform definition).
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If the Supreme Court is hesitant to follow the Second Circuit’s
decision in Townsend, another viable doctrinal option is
available.232 This novel solution uses the Supreme Court decision
in LaBonte as a doctrinal anchor.233 As discussed earlier, LaBonte
stands for the proposition that the Commission cannot
substantially deviate from their congressional directive.234 In
section 994(h), Congress directs the Commission to penalize “an
offense described in section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act
(21 U.S.C. 841), sections 1002(a), 1005, and 1009 of the Controlled
Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 952(a), 955,
and 959), and chapter 705 of title 46.”235 As was the case in
LaBonte, the language in § 994(h) is clear and unambiguous.236 The
Commission substantially deviated from the clear and
unambiguous directive when it defined the term “controlled
substance offense” to mean “an offense under federal or state law,”
even though § 994(h) has no mention of state law.237 For the
definition to adhere to the congressional directive, the state law
predicate offense would have to be a substance listed in the CSA.238
Using LaBonte to resolve the circuit split pairs well with the
Jerome Presumption, the reasoning in Taylor, and the Sentencing
Guidelines’ statutory mission.239 First, the Jerome Presumption
stands for the proposition that the application of federal law does
not depend on state law unless Congress “plainly indicates

232. See United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 762 (1997) (restricting the
Commission to their congressional directive).
233. See id. (noting doctrinal option).
234. See id. (forcing the Commission to abide by the congressional directive
set forth in § 994(h)).
235. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2006).
236. See LaBonte, 520 U.S. at 762 (holding the language in 994(h)
unambiguous).
237. U.S. SENT’G. GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
238. See United States v. Townsend, 897 F.3d 66, 68, 71 (2d Cir. 2018)
(holding that the term “controlled substance” in 4B1.2(b) refers exclusively to
those substances in the CSA).
239. See Townsend, 897 F.3d at 71 (using the Jerome Presumption to federally
define “controlled substance offence”); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602
(1990) (reasoning burglary should be federally defined); LaBonte, 520 U.S. at 762
(1997) (forcing the Commission to abide by the congressional directive set forth
in § 994(h)).

SENSLESS SENTENCING

243

otherwise.”240 Nowhere in § 994(h) does Congress plainly indicate
that solely state law can act as a predicate offense.241 Second,
Taylor seeks for uniformity in federal law when defining terms
such as “controlled substance offense.”242 Allowing the term
“controlled substance offense” to refer solely to substances listed in
the CSA would be in line with the reasoning in Taylor.243 Third,
the Commission itself has a goal of “reasonable uniformity in
sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed
for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders.”244
Federally defining “controlled substance offense” would
accomplish that goal. The Supreme Court should use LaBonte to
resolve the circuit split and direct the Commission to amend
4B1.2(b).
C. How the Commission Can Rectify the Issue on Remand Using
Previous Amendments
On remand, the Commission can resolve the issue by
reincorporating the phrase “substantially similar” to the definition
section in the career offender enhancement. The same argument
that resolves the Seventh Circuit’s issue with cross referencing
provides an outline for how the Commission can amend 4B1.2(b)
in light of a Supreme Court decision.245 In 1988, the Commission
was squarely within their authority to define “controlled substance
offense” when it directly incorporated the CSA.246 At the time,
4B1.2(b) read: “[t]he term “controlled substance offense” as used in
this provision means an offense identified in 21 U.S.C. §§ 841,
845b, 856, 952(a), 955, 955a, 959, and similar offenses.”247 The
240. Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943).
241. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2006) (referencing only federal law).
242. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (federally defining burglary).
243. See id. (reasoning burglary should be federally defined).
244. U.S. SENT’G. GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 3, pt. A1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018).
245. See U.S.SENT’G. COMM’N., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CAREER OFFENDER
SENTENCE app. A-7 (2016) (explaining the substantive changes in 4B1.2
throughout the years).
246. See id. at app. A-7 (noting controlled substance offense definition).
247. Id.
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commentary explained that “[c]ontrolled substance offense”
includes any federal or state offense that is substantially similar
to any of those listed in subsection (2) of the guideline.”248 The
Commission must return to this wording when defining “controlled
substance offense” in accordance with the Supreme Court’s
instruction. 4B1.2(b) should read:
The term “controlled substance offense” means an offense under
federal or [substantially similar] state law, punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the
manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a
controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the
possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance)
with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or
dispense.249

The addition of the “substantially similar” language will
resolve all of the ambiguity previously present in 4B1.2.250 Courts
will be able to interpret the provision with the understanding that
only state law “controlled substance offenses” that are listed in the
CSA may act as predicate offenses.251
In addition to the amendment, the Commission can also
explicitly state the reasoning behind the addition of the
“substantially similar” language.252 For example, in 1997, after the
Commission amended 4B1.2 it explained:
This amendment addresses a circuit court conflict regarding
whether the offenses of possessing a listed chemical with intent
to manufacture a controlled substance or possessing a
prohibited flask or equipment with intent to manufacture a
controlled substance are “controlled substance offenses” under
the career offender guideline . . . This amendment makes each
of these offenses a “controlled substance offense” under the
career offender guideline. This decision is based on the
Commission’s view that there is such a close connection
between possession of a listed chemical or prohibited flask or
equipment with intent to manufacture a controlled substance
248.
249.
250.

Id.
U.S. SENT’G. GUIDELINE § 4B1.2(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
See U.S.SENT’G. COMM’N., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CAREER OFFENDER
SENTENCE app. A-6 (U.S.Sent’g Comm’n 2016) (explaining the meaning behind the
phrase “substantially similar”).
251. See id. (showing the meaning of substantially similar).
252. See id. at A–12 (showing former explanations attached to amendments).
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and actually manufacturing a controlled substance that the
former offenses are fairly considered as controlled substance
trafficking offenses.253

In similar fashion, the Commission can explain the change in
4B1.2(b). The reasoning would look similar to this: This
amendment addresses a circuit court conflict regarding whether
the term “controlled substance offense” refers solely to substances
listed in the CSA or are standalone state law drug offenses
permissible under the career offender guideline.254 This
amendment makes only those substances listed in the CSA
“controlled substance offenses” under the career offender
guideline. This decision is based on the Commission’s view that
allowing standalone state law drug offenses to act as predicate
offenses is inconsistent with the congressional directive outlined in
§ 994(h).255
VI. Conclusion
Resolving the circuit split will only fix one of the many issues
surrounding the career offender sentencing enhancement, but
federally defining “controlled substance offense” will be a step in
the right direction. People like Walter Holmes, who graciously
allowed for his case to be used as an illustration, are often defined
by terms like defendant, criminal, felon, and convict.256 But
Walter, and people like him, have sons, daughters, and families
just like every other American.257 To allow standalone state law
offenses to trigger the enhancement would be a grave injustice—

253. Id.
254. Compare United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642, 654 (7th Cir. 2020)
(stating 4B1.2(b) refers to both federal and state law), with United States v.
Townsend, 897 F.3d 66, 68, 71 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that the term “controlled
substance” in 4B1.2(b) refers exclusively to those substances in the CSA).
255. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2006) (referencing only federal law).
256. See Tom Jackman, Guest Post: Justice Dept. Agency to Alter its
Terminology for Released Convicts, to Ease Reentry (changing the way to refer to
released convicts) [https://perma.cc/C6H7-JKKU].
257. See id. (“[N]o punishment is harsher than being permanently branded
“felon” or “offender.”).
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an injustice Congress never allowed, and the Commission never
intended.258

258.

See supra Part V.

